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WHY STATES MUST CONSIDER INNOCENCE CLAIMS AFTER
GUILTY PLEAS
I.

INTRODUCTION
Criminal prosecutions are resolved, overwhelmingly, through plea
bargains.1 Over the years, countless problems have become apparent in relation to this fact.2 One such problem is the chance that in*Associate Professor, Justice Studies at Montclair State University in New
Jersey. Received J.D. from New York University School of Law, and Ph.D. from
New York University’s Institute for Law and Society.
1

See John Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent
Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 163 (2014). As Blume and
Helm note,
Today plea bargaining is accepted as an essential and permanent component
of the American criminal justice system. Between 2008 and 2012 more than 96% of
all resolved criminal cases culminated in plea bargains rather than trial. In 2012,
97% of cases that were resolved were settled through pleas, with only 3% being
adjudicated in bench or jury trials. As Justice Anthony Kennedy recently observed:
“the reality [is] that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not
a system of trials.”
2

See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right
to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932
(1983) (highlighting the emphasis on economic savings, efficiency, and tactical
strategy, as opposed to human liberty and actual determinations of guilt and appropriate punishment); Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the
Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1055, 1060–61 (2015) [hereinafter Bibas, Accuracy and Fairness”] (arguing
that the criminal justice process was developed to ensure accuracy through the jury
process, and that plea bargaining allows limits on discovery, lawyers’ incentives,
and the workload and lack of resources of defense attorneys to “warp the bargaining process and outcomes”); Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence:
Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1364–65,
1370–71, 1394–97 (2000) (highlighting the ramifications of refusing to plead guilty,
that turn into punishment for “being innocent and insisting on a trial to establish that
fact”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1321, 1321, 1336–38 (2003) (suggesting that plea bargaining results
in greater numbers of wrongful convictions and the less accurate determination of
guilt may result in decreased deterrence); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2476–;79, 2482, 2486,
2493–;507, 2514, 2523 (2004). Plea bargaining has also been criticized for moving
a large degree of power away from judges and towards prosecutors. See Candace
McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform,
50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 84 (2005); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004).
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nocent defendants plead guilty to avoid the possibility of a wrongful
conviction and the harsh penalties that could accompany such a
conviction.3 Indeed, the development of DNA analysis has upended
much of the trust scholars once had in the overall accuracy of the
criminal justice process.4 Wrongful convictions, once thought to be
incredibly rare, are discovered more and more often.5 Similarly, the
assumption that innocent defendants will take their cases to trial
rather than plead them out has been proven false.6
What is a wrongly convicted defendant to do? As Colin Miller
explains,
Historically, defendants could not bring freestanding claims of
actual innocence. Instead, a defendant typically had two options
after being convicted. First, he could try to seek relief by presenting
newly discovered evidence [within a statutorily determined time
frame ranging from 21 days to two years after conviction]. Second, a
defendant could combine evidence of actual innocence with
evidence of a constitutional violation.7
Even if some other suspect confessed to the crime, the convicted
defendant would have to bring his appeal based on another claim,
“such as a claim that the confession was Brady material that the
State failed to disclose before trial.”8
But beginning in 1994, and directly in response to the development of DNA testing capabilities, many states have modified this
historical limitation.9 States have either by amended existing statutes
or written new ones in order to offer the chance for defendants to
appeal their convictions on the basis of claims of actual innocence,
whether by obtaining DNA or because of witness recantations or
other new evidence.10
Postconviction DNA testing is now supported by statute in every
state in the United States, but only for defendants who were found
3

Bibas, Accuracy and Fairness, supra note 2, at 1060; Blume & Helm, supra
note 1, at 172–75; Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System
Creates Incentives for False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126 (2013); Phoebe
C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, False Convictions, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY 163, 163 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012).
4

Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 3, at 163; see also Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 181 (2008).
5

Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 3, at 163.

6

Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 3, at 163; Gross, supra note 4, at 173, 183.

7

Colin Miller, Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims After Guilty Pleas,
10 UC IRVINE L. REV. 671, 688 (2020).
8

Miller, supra note 7, at 688.

9

Miller, supra note 7, at 675–76, 688.

10

Miller, supra note 7, at 675–76, 688.
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guilty at trial.11 Many innocent defendants who have pleaded guilty
may be precluded from obtaining DNA evidence or using that
evidence to appeal their convictions, because they pleaded guilty
rather than taking the case to trial.12 It is this problem that Miller addresses in his article, Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims
After Guilty Pleas.13 While others have suggested that substantive
due process offers a right to prove innocence even after accepting a
plea bargain, Miller points out that “these arguments have been
largely foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s conclusion in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne that there is
no substantive due process right to postconviction DNA testing.”14
But despite this hurdle, Miller argues that the Supreme Court’s support of the “right to access the courts” provides a due process route
to a constitutional right to appeal a guilty plea on the basis of DNA
or non-DNA evidence of actual innocence. 15 His argument is
reviewed below.
II. COLIN MILLER, WHY STATES MUST CONSIDER INNOCENCE CLAIMS AFTER
GUILTY PLEAS, 10 UC IRVINE L. REV. 671 (2020).
The first postconviction DNA statute was passed in New York in
1994, only five years after the first instance of a convicted defendant
proving his innocence through postconviction DNA testing.16 In the
quarter century that has passed since New York’s statute was created, every state in the country has passed a statute addressing this
issue.17 Yet, as might be expected, the specifics of the statutes vary.
11

Miller, supra note 7, at 676, 678–88.

12

Miller, supra note 7, at 678–88.

13

Miller, supra note 7.

14

Miller, supra note 7, at 673–74 (citing Daina Borteck, Note, Pleas for DNA
Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State Postconviction DNA Testing Statutes
to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1429 (2004); Justin
Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of Postconviction
DNA Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 799
(2011); Eunyung Theresa Oh, Note, Innocence After Guilt: Postconviction DNA
Relief for Innocents Who Pled Guilty, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161 (2004); Rebecca
Stephens, Comment, Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those Who Plead
Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and Recommendations for Reform, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309 (2013); cf. J.H. Dingfelder Stone,
Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The Illogic of Postconviction DNA Testing for
Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 47 (2010); District Attorney’s
Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 54, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 174 L.
Ed. 2d 38 (2009).
15

Miller, supra note 7, at 674.

16

Miller, supra note 7, at 675.

17

Miller, supra note 7, at 674.
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Miller begins his discussion with an overview of the types of statutes
that exist across the country.18
The statutes vary as to time the defendant has to bring his claim,19
type of conviction where defendants may be allowed to seek
postconviction DNA testing,20 and burden of proof in order to obtain
the testing.21 States also vary as to the circumstances under which a
new trial will be required.22 And, finally, states vary as to their treatment of defendants who pleaded guilty rather than being found guilty
at trial, with several states explicitly providing postconviction DNA
testing in such cases, others explicitly rejecting it, and many working
the issue out through judicial determination based on other factors.23
Those states that do not explicitly state whether defendants who
pleaded may request postconviction DNA testing are similarly
inconsistent in their methods of determining the issue. In some
states, statutes require that a defendant’s identity was at issue in the
case for postconviction DNA testing to be authorized, and courts in
six of those states have determined that defendants who pleaded
guilty cannot claim that identity was an issue in their case.24 To these
judges, a guilty plea means that the defendant “did not contest the
question of who committed those acts.”25 Not all such states have
resolved the matter in this manner; however, a few statutes explicitly
18

Miller, supra note 7, at 675.

19

Statutes range from Alabama’s limit of one year after final conviction to
states that have no statute of limitations. Miller, supra note 7, at 676–77 (citing ALA.
CODE § 15-18-200 (2019) (within one year of conviction); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 12.73.010 (West 2019) (no statute of limitations); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West
2018) (no statute of limitations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2019) (within
three years of final judgment); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 930.4, 930.8 (2014)
(within two years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2136 to 2138 (West 2019) (within
two years of conviction); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 590.01 to.06 (West 2019) (within two
years of final judgment).
20

For instance, some states only allow such testing in after felony convictions,
or specific felony convictions, or capital cases, while other states provide for testing
after convictions of any level. Miller, supra note 7, at 677 nn. 39-42 and accompanying text.
21

States vary from “require[ing] a prima facie showing that the evidence to be
tested is material to the conviction or the issue of guilt” to requiring the defendant to
provide clear and convincing evidence that the DNA testing will prove innocence.
Miller, supra note 7, at 677 nn. 43–45 and accompanying text.
22

Miller describes the range as between whether it is “reasonably probable that
the person would not have been convicted” had the evidence been available during
trial to “a substantial possibility that the petitioner would not have been convicted.”
Miller, supra note 7, at 677–78 nn. 46–47 and accompanying text.
23

Miller, supra note 7, at 678–88.

24

Miller, supra note 7, at 679.

25

Miller, supra note 7, at 681 (quoting People v. Urioste, 316 Ill. App. 3d 307,
249 Ill. Dec. 512, 736 N.E.2d 706, 714 (5th Dist. 2000)).
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state that a defendant who pleaded may still apply for DNA testing
even while keeping the “identity in issue” language in their statutes,
while others have not yet resolved the issue.26
Interestingly, while some state statutes specifically refer to trials,
only two states have judicially interpreted that requirement to
preclude defendants who pleaded guilty from receiving postconviction DNA analysis; and both of those states later amended their
statutes to allow for testing.27 Other states with trials explicitly
mentioned in their statutes have not yet resolved the issue of
whether defendants who pleaded guilty are precluded from seeking
postconviction DNA tests.28
However, many states have none of the above requirements, and
courts’ treatment of appellants who were convicted by plea has
varied widely.29 Many states simply have not addressed the issue,
yet.30
DNA is not the only evidence that might exonerate a defendant
after conviction, and the same trends that led to a recognition of the
need for postconviction DNA testing have led to the creation of
statutes to allow for freestanding innocence claims based on other
sources.31 Like in the case of postconviction DNA analysis, these
statutes (and courts that interpret them) vary in their treatment of
defendants who pleaded guilty.32 Some states explicitly require a
defendant to have pleaded not guilty,33 while others explicitly provide
the option for pleading defendants, 34 some state courts have
interpreted statutes that are silent on the matter to preclude the option for pleading defendants,35 and others have not yet resolved the
matter.36
Having described the varied and contradictory state determinations of the right to seek an appeal based on actual innocence,
Miller next turns to the state of constitutional doctrine.37 As Miller
describes, in the early 2000s there appeared to be a path to a due
26

Miller, supra note 7, at 681–83.

27

Miller, supra note 7, at 683–84.

28

Miller, supra note 7, at 684–85.

29

Miller, supra note 7, at 686–88.

30

Miller, supra note 7, at 688.

31

Miller, supra note 7, at 688–89.

32

Miller, supra note 7, at 689–92.

33

Miller, supra note 7, at 689.

34

Miller, supra note 7, at 691–92.

35

Miller, supra note 7, at 691.

36

Miller, supra note 7, at 692.

37

Miller, supra note 7, at 692.

102

© 2021 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 57 No. 1

FROM THE LEGAL LITERATURE
process right to postconviction DNA testing, but this path was
abruptly blocked in 2009 with the Court’s decision in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District. v. Osborne.38
As Miller explains, in Osborne, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the idea that there might be a substantive due process right
to acquiring DNA evidence. 39 The Court instead adopted the
framework of Medina v. California, under which “a state procedural
rule only violates procedural due process if it ‘offends some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental.’ ’’ 40 Two years later, the Court
reinforced the presumption against a right to acquiring DNA
evidence, stating “Osborne severely limits the federal action a state
prisoner may bring for DNA testing . . . and left slim room for the
prisoner to show that the governing state law denies him procedural
due process.”41 In apparent response to these rulings, Miller notes,
“no court has [since] found that a state’s postconviction DNA testing
statute violates procedural due process,” and Osborne may well
have changed the direction that New York courts were heading when
Osborne was decided.42 The same is true of non-DNA actual innocent statutes.43
Defendants have also brought equal protection challenges to
limitations of postconviction DNA and non-DNA innocence claims,
and Miller addresses these challenges next.44 In the context of
postconviction DNA testing, challenges have been based on the assertion that distinguishing between crimes that qualify for postconviction innocence claims violates equal protection.45 For instance, one
case was brought, and won, based on a state statute allowing
postconviction DNA testing for rape convictions, but not for aggravated criminal sodomy.46 Another was brought, and lost, for allowing postconviction DNA testing for “crimes of violence,” but not
38

Miller, supra note 7, at 693 (citing District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial
Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 174 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2009)).
39

Miller, supra note 7, at 695–96.

40

Miller, supra note 7, at 696 (quoting Osborne IV, 557 U.S. at 69–70; Medina
v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1992)).
41

Miller, supra note 7, at 697 (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525,
131 S. Ct. 1289, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011)).
42

Miller, supra note 7, at 697.

43

Miller, supra note 7, at 699.

44

Miller, supra note 7, at 700.

45

Miller, supra note 7, at 700–02.

46

Miller, supra note 7, at 700–01.
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conspiracy.47 Equal protection claims also have been brought to
challenge state statutes that allow defendants to seek a new trial
due to postconviction DNA testing, but not other claims of
innocence. 48 These claims have not been successful. 49 Miller
concludes his section on the state of constitutional claims to
postconviction appeals for defendants who have pleaded guilty by
summarizing that there are few such avenues currently available.50
In the following section, he begins to explain how right of access to
the courts might function to provide another, more effective such
path.51
Doctrinally, the right of meaningful access to the courts dates back
to Griffin v. Illinois,52 a 1956 Supreme Court case holding that, once
a state has granted a right to appeal, the state cannot allow poverty
to foreclose a defendant’s opportunity to utilize that right.53 Later
case clarified that this was a right to “appellate systems that are
‘free of unreasoned distinctions.’ ’’ 54 Poverty being one such
unreasonable distinction, the Court has expanded the right to
invalidate blocks in the appellate process such as docket fees and
the lack of legal research facilities.55
In 2005, this reasoning led the Court to invalidate a distinction
between pleading and non-pleading defendants.56 Specifically, the
state of Michigan had amended its state constitution to allow courts
discretion to refuse to hear the appeal of a defendant who had
pleaded guilty. 57 Based on this, the state argued that indigent
defendants need not be provided appellate counsel, as their right to
appeal was within the discretion of the appellate courts.58 The U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed, acknowledging that the state had a
rational interest to make the distinction but stating that allowing
states the ability to summarily refuse to pay for appellate counsel for
indigent defendants made the right to appeal “more formal than
47

Miller, supra note 7, at 701–02.

48

Miller, supra note 7, at 702.

49

Miller, supra note 7, at 702.

50

Miller, supra note 7, at 703.

51

Miller, supra note 7, at 703.

52

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d
1055 (1956).
53

Miller, supra note 7, at 703–04.

54

Miller, supra note 7, at 705.

55

Miller, supra note 7, at 705–06.

56

Miller, supra note 7, at 707–09.

57

Miller, supra note 7, at 707.

58

Miller, supra note 7, at 707.
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real.”59 Miller argues that this decision stands for the proposition
that, while states may make reasoned distinctions between pleading
and non-pleading defendants, they may not wholly “cut off any right
for pleading defendants to appeal.”60 Miller adds that this reasoning
is further suggested in Bounds v. Smith, wherein the Court found
right of access to the courts to be particularly salient in cases “raising heretofore unlitigated issues” (as do claims of actual innocence).61
These decisions suggest that, as states have granted a right to appeal based on actual innocence, they cannot fully deny that right
based solely on a defendant’s decision to plead guilty.62 Miller further
notes that later circuit court cases have suggested a similar
argument.63
Having addressed the question of whether the right exists, Miller
goes on to discuss an issue challenged in New York and Maryland
courts—that of the feasibility of responding to such claims.64 He
notes that both of these states have responded to the question
legislatively by passing or amending statutes to allow for the claims.65
He then turns to the question of standards by which to judge those
claims, referencing the ineffective assistance of counsel test, which
is routinely applied to pleading defendants.66 As Miller notes, the
standard turns to whether a defendant has been prejudiced—at trial,
that is a question of whether “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”67 Applying that standard to pleading defendants merely changes the
standard to “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty.”68 As Miller states, “[i]f DNA testing
revealed that the hairs likely came from a serial killer in the area
who was unknown to the defendant, it is probable that . . . (1) the
defendant would neither have pleaded guilty nor been told to plead
59

Miller, supra note 7, at 707 (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 620,
125 S. Ct. 2582, 162 L. Ed. 2d 552 (2005)).
60

Miller, supra note 7, at 709–10.

61

Miller, supra note 7, at 711 (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827, 97
S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977) (abrogated by, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996))).
62

Miller, supra note 7, at 711.

63

Miller, supra note 7, at 714–15.

64

Miller, supra note 7, at 715–16.

65

Miller, supra note 7, at 716.

66

Miller, supra note 7, at 716–17.

67

Miller, supra note 7, at 717.

68

Miller, supra note 7, at 717.
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guilty; and (2) the jury would not have convicted him.”69 Miller notes,
further, that this standard is already being used in some states.70
Outside of the question of standards, the Maryland and New York
courts also raised concerns about testing innocence without a trial
record and threatening the system of plea bargains that today’s
criminal justice system relies on.71 These issues are resolved, he
argues, in the case of Missouri v. Frye, wherein the Supreme Court,
recognizing that the vast majority of cases are decided by plea
bargains, suggested that this very centrality required the protection
of certain rights of pleading defendants.72 To do otherwise would
practically erase them.
Miller acknowledges that not all distinctions between pleading and
non-pleading defendants are necessarily unreasonable (and
therefore unacceptable).73 He suggests that differing burdens of
proof, or requiring to prove identity is in issue might be reasonable
(if this question is not resolved solely on the basis that the defendant
pleaded).74 Returning to Michigan v. Halbert, the Supreme Court’s
2005 case, Miller argues that a claim of actual innocence is clearly
distinguishable from most post-plea claims (which might be reasonably distinguished from post-trial claims).75 Unlike most post-plea
claims, Miller notes, claims of actual innocence are indistinguishable
from post-trial claims of actual innocence, in that both involve new
evidence of actual innocence rather than violations of constitutional
rights (which would have occurred prior to the plea).76 Moreover,
there is empirical evidence that claims of actual innocence,
particularly in the context of DNA testing, are successful far more
often than other post-plea direct appeals.77
In sum, Miller argues that states that have created a right to appellate review for claims of actual innocence cannot foreclose that
right to pleading defendants.78 He notes, however, that while all
69

Miller, supra note 7, at 717.

70

Miller, supra note 7, at 718.

71

Miller, supra note 7, at 720.

72

Miller, supra note 7, at 720–21.

73

Miller, supra note 7, at 722.

74

Miller, supra note 7, at 722.

75

Miller, supra note 7, at 724–25.

76

Miller, supra note 7, at 724–25.

77

Miller, supra note 7, at 725–26.

78

Miller, supra note 7, at 726.
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states offer this right for the sake of DNA testing, not every state offers it for other, non-DNA evidence of innocence.79
III. CONCLUSION
As Miller highlights in this article, the numbers of wrongfully
convicted defendants have far outstripped what many of us might
have expected—reaching 40% of defendants who have requested
and successfully obtained DNA analysis through the Innocence
Project.80 This fact seems to be recognized in the steady movement
of states and state courts towards providing the right to test DNA
and appeal based on other new evidence of actual innocence.81 And
given this movement, and the prevalence of guilty pleas in the
criminal justice system, distinctions between pleading and nonpleading defendants do seem ridiculous. Yet Supreme Court
doctrine, thus far, has discouraged due process rights to post-plea
appeals based on actual innocence.82 Miller highlights that the right
to access may require erasing the distinction between pleading and
non-pleading defendants in the area of post-plea appeals based on
actual innocence, particular in the context of DNA testing. His argument is convincing, and should be considered by attorneys, judges,
and legislators.
79

Miller, supra note 7, at 726.

80

Miller, supra note 7, at 726.

81

See Miller, supra note 7, at 675.

82

Miller, supra note 7, at 695–703.
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